We extend theories of self-regulation of physical commons to analyze self-regulation of intangible commons that arise in modern industry. We posit that when the action of one firm can cause spillover harm to others in the industry, firms share a type of commons. We theorize that the need to protect this commons can motivate self-regulation. Using data from the US chemical industry, we find that spillover harm from industrial accidents increased after a major industrial crisis and decreased following the formation of a new institution. Additionally, our findings suggest that the institution lessened spillovers from participants to the broader industry.
1 Interest in self-regulatory institutions, whereby firms in an industry create and voluntarily abide by a set of governing rules, has gone through a renaissance of late (for overviews, see Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Prakash & Potoski, 2006; Wotruba, 1997) . Scholars have investigated self-regulatory institutions in industries as diverse as chemicals (King & Lenox, 2000; Lenox, 2006) , hospitality and recreation (Rivera and de Leon, 2004) , nuclear power (Rees, 1994) , and maritime shipping (Furger, 1997) . Drawing from the work of Elinor Ostrom (1990) and Douglas North (1981) , many of these scholars argue that self-regulatory institutions arise to constrain individual actions that might harm the industry as a whole. Ostrom's (1990) work on community self-regulation has been particularly influential in framing recent research. She demonstrates that those who share in common pool resources like fisheries or forests can unite to create an institution that helps them avert the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) .
However, the theoretical and empirical foundation of this growing stream of the management literature remains uncertain and contradictory. First, the common pool resource dilemmas that Ostrom considers are not apparent in many industries where self-regulation has arisen. The literature has yet to establish whether the same logic that Ostrom applied to the governance of shared physical resources can be extended to modern industries. Second, empirical studies of self-regulation have often fallen victim to what Granovetter (1985) dismissed as "bad functionalism" in that they infer the function that an institution was created to fulfill not by observing the conditions that preceded its creation but rather by observing conditions after its implementation. Third, research on some frequently studied institutions seems to provide contradictory evidence with respect to their function. For several important self-regulatory institutions, scholars have failed to find any evidence that the institution limits the harmful practices of member firms, yet studies of these same institutions show that they provide a benefit to firms in the industry (King & Lenox, 2000; Rivera & de Leon, 2004 , Lenox, 2006 .
In this article, we resolve these shortcomings and so strengthen the theoretical and empirical foundation of the literature on self-regulatory institutions. First, we draw attention to the existence of a novel type of "commons problem" that exists in many industries. We argue that the action of one firm may affect other firms in its industry because stakeholders lack the ability to impose precisely targeted sanctions, and this causes all firms to share a pooled risk.
Second, we avoid bad functionalism by developing a mechanism for measuring this shared risk over a time period that spans both the emergence of our hypothesized commons problem and the formation of the self-regulatory institution. Finally, by more precisely identifying how the institution provides benefits to the industry, we provide new insight on how inconsistencies in the existing literature may be resolved.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Institutions are the "humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction" (North, 1990: 97) . North (1990) separates institutions into those that operate through formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws, and constitutions) and those that operate through informal constraints (e.g. norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct). Ingram and Clay (2000) refine North's typology by suggesting that institutions should be classified as (1) public or private, and (2) centralized or decentralized. Public institutions are usually compulsory and are often run by the state. Private institutions -those run by organizations or individuals -are voluntary in nature, because actors can opt in or out. In the centralized form of these institutions, a central authority sets rules, incentives, and sanctions for non-compliance. For example, many private institutions (e.g. for-profit firms) have a principal that is ultimately in charge of internal procedures. Decentralized forms of these institutions lack a powerful central authority and thus rely on the action of numerous independent actors to encourage compliance with institutional rules. In many industrial settings, anti-trust laws forbid centralized industry bodies from controlling and sanctioning member firm behaviors and so industry self-regulation tends to take the form of private and decentralized institutions.
Until recently, many scholars dismissed the viability of self-regulatory institutions. The influential analyses of Olson (1965) and Hardin (1968) suggested that since participation is voluntary and free from enforcement by a central authority, each actor has incentive to defect from agreements and so such institutions should generally fall victim to "the tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) . However, widespread skepticism about self-regulatory institutions began to change as a result of a series of investigations in the 1980s and 1990s (c.f. Wade, 1988; Berkes, 1989; Acheson, 1988; Ostrom, 1990) .
Elinor Ostrom's work has had the greatest impact in changing perceptions of the potential for self-regulation. Through a series of comparative case studies, she demonstrated that individuals could, in fact, organize institutions to cope with overuse of commonly-held resources such as fresh water aquifers, fisheries, and forests (Ostrom, 1990) . When actors could negotiate, observe, and enforce compliance with common rules, she argued, self-regulatory institutions could protect commonly held resources, and the benefits provided by protection of these common resources could spur participation. In her own assessment, her work helped "shatter the convictions of many policy analysts that the only way to solve common pool resource problems is for external authorities to impose full private property rights or centralized regulation" (Ostrom, 1990) . Later in the decade, based on field research conducted by her workshop, she concluded that " individuals in all walks of life and all parts of the world voluntarily organize themselves so as to gain the benefits of trade, to provide mutual protection against risk, and to create and enforce rules that protect natural resources" (Ostrom, 2000: 138) .
The notion that self-regulatory institutions can be viable solutions to commons problems has begun to gain traction in the management literature (King & Lenox, 2000; Rivera and de Leon, 2004; Jiang and Bansal, 2003) . These studies have focused on the determinants of participation in a self-regulatory institution, though, and have not explored the conditions antecedent to their formation. As Ingram and Clay (2000: 539) conclude in their review of the literature on institutions, beyond Ostrom, Ingram and Inman's (1996) 
study of hoteliers around
Niagara Falls is perhaps the only other study that conducts the longitudinal analysis needed to understand the relationship between the existence of a commons problem and self-regulation.
They show that faced with the threat of potential damage to a commonly valued resource, Niagara Falls, hoteliers were able to form a self-regulatory institution that limited development and so protected the scenery of the Falls, thereby increasing the survival of nearby hotels. Ingram and Inman (1996) follow Ostrom (1990) in arguing that the need to protect a shared physical resource such as water or land can act as the catalyst for effective self-regulation.
Yet, few modern industries are challenged by dwindling stocks of a physical resource openly shared with rivals, but many modern industries engage in self-regulation. For example, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations did not arise in the face of overuse of shared stocks of uranium in the nuclear power industry, nor did the Beer Institute Code arise in the face of threatened shortages of communal supplies of barley or hops in the brewing industry. What might explain the frequent presence of self-regulation in settings such as these?
As we discuss next, firms in an industry share a sort of non-physical commons that can be damaged by the acts of each firm in the industry. This creates an industry wide commons problem that can develop into a serious threat to the success and survival of member firms following a major industry crisis. We hypothesize that industry self-regulation may arise to resolve this type of a commons problem in modern industries.
Industry Commons: A Shared Fate through Shared Sanctions
Interdependence among firms is implicit in the concept of an industry. Firms are rivals because they have similar and closely substitutable characteristics. As a result, the actions of one firm are bound to reflect to some degree on all firms within its industry and so shape how observers assess, reward, and sanction firms within it. King, Lenox, and Barnett (2002) argue that this interdependence can be viewed as a sort of intangible commons that they term a "reputation commons." A firm's reputation is based on observers' judgments of the actions of that firm over time (Fombrun, 1996) . If observers can judge the impacts of a firm independent of the actions of its rivals, no commons exits. However, when one firm's actions influence the reputation of another or the reputation of the industry as a whole, a commons arises.
This conflating of observers' assessments of the characteristics of a firm with those of its rivals can be favorable if, for example, one firm's success helps to legitimize an emerging industry and so eases all such firms' access to resources (cf., Hannan & Carroll, 1992) , but it can also be problematic. Just as one firm's success can spill over to other firms, so can the harm caused by misdeeds. For example, recent news of contaminated spinach harmed the sale of all salad products -not just the ones where the contamination was found (Galvin, 2007) .
Management researchers have established that "industry effects" account for a significant portion of firm performance (Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991; McGahan & Porter, 1997) , but the management literature has been less attentive to the potential for firm misdeeds to harm the entire industry. Yet, research in financial economics suggests that a negative event attributable to a single firm can indeed have adverse financial consequences for the industry as a whole. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) find that a drug recall by one pharmaceutical firm caused a portfolio of 50 rival firm stocks to drop by one percent. They find an even stronger industry-wide effect in the automobile industry. When Ford or Chrysler initiated a recall, General Motors actually experienced a larger loss than the recalling firm. Hill and Schneeweis (1983) report a loss in market value of a portfolio of all electrical utility stocks following the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant. Mitchell (1989) concludes that the firms in the over-the-counter pharmaceutical industry lost $4.06 billion following the deadly Tylenol tampering incident.
This shared fate of industry members stems from the broad or arbitrary application of stakeholder sanctions (Dawson and Segerson, 2005; King et al., 2002) . The broad application of sanctions is more likely when stakeholders are unable to discriminate high and low performer firms in an industry. For example, unable to ascertain which firms had contributed to toxic waste dumps, the U.S. government imposed a fee on all chemical producers to fund the Superfund cleanup effort. In other cases, stakeholders may select individual firms arbitrarily for sanctioning, thereby putting all firms in the industry at risk. For example, activist discontent with working conditions in the coffee, athletic shoe, and apparel industries led to high-profile protests and boycotts against individual firms in these industries -Starbucks, Nike, and Kathy Lee Gifford -that used suppliers with no worse, and in some cases, superior working conditions than those employed by their rivals (Malkin, 1996; Hornblower, 2000) .
In summary, rival firms share many common characteristics. When one firm succeeds, it can ease rivals' access to resources, but when one firm errs, it can harm its rivals. Observers, either unable to untangle a firm's performance from that of the industry, or as a result of increasing their expectations that the focal firm could err in a similar way in the future, may collectively, or even randomly, sanction members of the industry, thereby creating an industry commons. To test the existence of this industry commons, we thus hypothesize that firms in an industry will be harmed by the misdeeds of other industry members.
Hypothesis 1: An error at one firm will harm other firms in its industry.
Industry Commons as a Problem
The mere existence of an industry commons is not sufficient to explain self-regulatory institutions. Rivalry, inertia, and the inherent cost of forming and maintaining such an institution inhibit firms from coming together (Barnett, 2006) . Members of a commons may be motivated to surmount these barriers, though, when confronted with a crisis. Studies of physical commons have shown that self-regulation often occurs after overuse threatens the continued viability of a shared resource. For example, self-regulation in the Maine Lobster industry arose after a collapse of the fishery caused the closure of some canneries (Acheson & Knight, 2000) . Crisis can help actors overcome cognitive barriers and recognize the existence and importance of a commons (Weber, Kopelman & Messick, 2004) , and it can also change expectations of the value of taking action (Vasi & Macy, 2003 ).
An industry commons cannot be physically depleted the same way a fishery can be, but it can become damaged in a way that significantly harms firms and even threatens the industry's ongoing "license to operate." For example, the crisis at Three Mile Island in 1979 sparked such deep and enduring public concern about nuclear safety that regulators have not approved any new nuclear power plants in the US since. Major events like Three Mile Island can be a catalyst for shifts in stakeholder perceptions of an industry (Rees, 1997 , Meyer, 1982 Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001) . Hoffman (1999) argues that stakeholder perceptions of an industry are based on metaphors. These perceptions can change "suddenly and unpredictably" (pg. 366) as events influence taken-for-granted assumptions and create new metaphors about the industry. These new metaphors influence the interpretation of future events, and they can cause even minor events to draw attention and raise the threat of greater sanctions for an industry. Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings (2002) describe a similar process in which "jolts" (Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990 ) deinstitutionalize established industry practices and set in motion a process of "theorization" that determines how observers will view future industry practices.
Consider the airline industry in the aftermath of September 11 th, 2001. The events of September 11th shifted how observers viewed the airline industry, causing many to assess airplanes not merely as a means of transportation, but also as a means of terrorism. Under this shifted mindset, observers focused much more attention on airline activity and interpreted new events in light of their potential to be part of a terrorist plot. As a result, minor breaches of security that had previously gone unnoticed or unquestioned now drew media attention and engendered public calls for more stringent security protocols that raised costs and sometimes lowered demand for the entire industry.
Reports of executives in the petroleum and nuclear power industries validate this perspective. Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, an Amoco executive noted that now his firm would "have to live with the sins of our brothers. We were doing fine until Exxon spilled all that oil. Then we were painted with the same brush as them" (quoted in Hoffman, 1997: 189) . According to the founding chairman of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island crisis, "it hit us that an event at a nuclear plant anywhere in our country . . . could and would affect each nuclear plant . . . Each licensee is a hostage of each other licensee" (Rees, 1994: 2) . Therefore, we hypothesize that a major crisis in an industry causes an increase in the severity of shared sanctions that firms suffer following the error of any firm in that industry.
Hypothesis 2: A major industry crisis causes increased intra-industry spillovers from errors.

Industry Self-regulation as the Solution
From William Forster Lloyd (1833) through Garrett Hardin's famous 1968 essay, the idea of "The Tragedy of the Commons" has powerfully influenced scholarly and popular belief that the resolution of commons problems requires government intervention. The standard refrain is that the choice is simple: Leviathan or Oblivion (Ophuls, 1973) . In recent years, some scholars have challenged this long-held notion, suggesting that actors who share a common resource can form self-regulatory institutions to constrain actions that might lead to abuse of the commons. When the competitive positions of firms in an industry are put at risk due to the commons-depleting actions of any individual firm within the industry, the members of the industry have a clear interest in creating an institution that protects the commons. Ostrom (1990) shows that actors often form institutions to avert the tragedies associated with common properties, and Ingram and Inman (1996) show that hoteliers around Niagara Falls, driven by the fear of lost tourism revenue, banded together to form institutions which regulated development around the Falls.
We extend the logic of self-regulation of physical commons such as water or land to selfregulation of intangible industry commons. Firms share an interest in maintaining their common reputation so as to reduce their shared risk of sanction. The threat of more stringent regulation following the Three Mile Island crisis, for example, prompted nuclear power industry executives to create the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, a "private regulatory bureaucracy" charged to "develop standards, conduct inspections, and investigate accidents" (Rees, 1997: 478) Though the literature has not previously addressed the role of industry self-regulatory institutions in resolving the threat of shared sanctions stemming from a common reputation, scholars have previously proposed a "functionalist" perspective on institutions. A functionalist perspective evidences that firms can come together to create institutions to alleviate shared problems. Such a perspective was originally proposed by scholars such as North (1981) and Williamson (1985) who suggested that actors might create governing institutions to ameliorate conditions that impede effective social exchange. They argued that the potential for gain could encourage economic actors to create new controlling institutions, despite the individual burdens.
However, Granovetter's (1985) criticism of the empirical basis for such claims dampened research in this area. He dismissed such studies as "bad functionalism" because they began with a functionalist conclusion and then inferred "the evolutionary problem that must have existed for the institution as we see it to have developed" (Schotter, 1981; in Granovetter, 1985: 489) .
We hypothesize a functional role for industry self-regulatory institutions, but rather than inferring the problem that must have existed for such an institution to have arisen, in the prior hypothesis we outline the common problem that precipitates institution creation. By first identifying the specific common problem that we hypothesize the institution will ameliorate, we avoid the trap of bad functionalism.
Hypothesis 3: An industry self-regulatory institution created following a major crisis will
reduce intra-industry spillovers from errors.
Exploring the Mechanisms of Industry Self-regulation
An explanation of self-regulation should include a specification of the means through which it achieves its function. Previous research has argued that self-regulation helps firms a) signal superior attributes or b) cooperate with rivals. Self-regulatory institutions that operate as signals help participating firms differentiate themselves from non-participants relative to some criteria which stakeholders value but cannot observe directly. For example, participation might be cost-effective only for those with superior quality, and thus participation allows firms to credibly reveal this hidden quality. In contrast, self-regulatory institutions that facilitate cooperation help firms coordinate effort toward some shared goal. For example, firms might pool their resources to lobby government for changes in trade policies.
Scholars predict that self-regulatory institutions that include third-party certification of compliance with institutional rules may act as signals while those that lack such certification are more likely to facilitate cooperation (Potoski and Prakash, 2005) . Empirical research on several certification programs provide support for the signaling hypothesis, but research on selfregulatory programs that lack such certification seem to provide evidence that is both contradictory and in conflict with proposed theoretical models (King & Lenox, 2000; Rivera and de Leon, 2004; Lenox, 2006) . A common theoretical model for self-regulatory institutions that operate without a certification mechanism is that they allow firms to forestall stakeholder action by helping firms coordinate just enough improvement to dissuade stakeholders from taking action to force further improvements (Dawson & Segerson, 2005) . Since stakeholders (including regulators) bear some cost from acting, this additional improvement can be smaller than the stakeholder would impose, but it must be higher than would have occurred without the support of the institution. This model has been very influential in setting trajectories for further research, but it has not yet been supported by empirical investigations. In conflict with the model's predictions, several authors find that participants in such self-regulatory programs do not improve any faster than nonparticipants (King & Lenox, 2000; Howard, Nash, and Ehrenfeld, 2000; Rivera and de Leon, 2004) . In some cases, empirical studies of different outcomes from self-regulation have revealed seemingly inconsistent and contradictory findings. King and Lenox (2000) argue that participants in the chemical industry's Responsible Care program reduced their toxic emissions more slowly than non-participants. Yet, Lenox (2006) reports that that average stock values increased in the chemical industry after the program was formed, and he infers that stakeholders were rewarding the industry for improvement relative to some desired criteria.
Why would a program that does not seem to provide benefit to stakeholders earn their favor? One possibility is that self-regulation may allow firms to directly improve the reputation of the industry or reduce the threat of sanction. For example, by unifying the regulatory strategies of firms it might reduce the threat that any event would trigger costly sanctions. In this view, firms are regulating and coordinating their non-market strategy (Baron, 1995) , not their improvement efforts. Another possibility is that firms reduce the propensity for stakeholder action by cooperating to directly assuage stakeholder concern. For example, the chemical industry emphasized such an approach when they initiated the Responsible Care program. The first code promulgated under the program, Community Awareness and Emergency Response, was not designed to reduce the risk of accidents. Instead, this code required managers of facilities of participating firms "to identify and respond to community concerns, inform the community of risks associated with company operations, and have its own emergency plan integrated and tested with the community's emergency response plan" (CCPA, 2007) .
Giving stakeholders access to additional information may reduce the risk of harm to the communities surrounding plants by speeding emergency response to accidents. It might also reduce stakeholder fears of such events, regardless of any actual reduction in the impact of these events. Research shows that the perceived risk of events is elevated when these risks come from systems about which actors have little information. Slovik and Weber (2002) report that:
The informativeness or signal potential of a mishap, and thus its potential social impact, appears to be systematically related to the perceived characteristics of the hazard. An accident that takes many lives may produce relatively little social disturbance (beyond that caused to the victims' families and friends) if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-understood system (e.g., a train wreck). However, a small incident in an unfamiliar system (or one perceived as poorly understood), such as a nuclear waste repository or a recombinant DNA laboratory, may have immense social consequences if it is perceived as a harbinger of future and possibly catastrophic mishaps.
In summary, scholars expect the design of a self-regulatory program to influence the pattern of benefits it provides its members and the industry as a whole. If it includes a means of certifying and communicating compliance to a set of rules, scholars expect a self-regulatory institution to act like a market signal and provide a private benefit to members only. If it operates without such a certifying mechanism, then scholars expect it to help its members achieve some commonly valued goal like forestalling government regulation.
We choose to focus on this latter category because industry-sponsored self-regulation often lacks a certification mechanism (Howard et al., 2000) . Moreover, as discussed above, little is known about the benefits provided by these programs, and more nuanced understanding of the pattern of benefits will help reveal the underlying functional mechanisms of these institutions.
Self-regulation that forestalls government sanction by coordinating the non-market strategies of member firms should reduce the harmful spillover from negative events no matter where they occur. Self-regulation that coordinates programs to inform stakeholders and assuage their concerns should reduce the spillover harm when a negative event occurs at a participating firm.
Hypothesis 4a:
An industry self-regulatory institution created following a major crisis will reduce intra-industry spillovers from the errors of any firm in the industry. Hypothesis 4b: An industry self-regulatory institution created following a major crisis will reduce intra-industry spillovers from the errors of participating firms.
RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODOLOGY
To test our hypotheses, we need an industry that experiences frequent errors of varying significance, has suffered a major crisis, and has created a self-regulatory institution in the aftermath of this major crisis. The US chemical industry meets all of these requirements.
Members of the industry suffer multiple accidents each year, and these accidents vary in significance. Most are small and involve the unplanned release of potentially toxic chemicals.
More serious accidents injure or kill employs or even local citizens. Industry experts and industry members report that one accident precipitated a major crisis for the industry. On December 3 rd , 1984, methyl isocyanate leaked from a Union Carbide facility in Bhopal, India and killed between three and ten thousand people. Many thousands more were injured (Shrivastava, 1987) . It remains the most deadly industrial accident on record.
Anecdotal reports from managers in the chemical industry around the time of these events support the perspective on industry commons we have hypothesized. Numerous respondents report that the accident at Bhopal created a crisis for the entire chemical industry by changing how observers viewed the risks of chemical manufacturing. Ronald Lang, then executive director of the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, noted, "Bhopal focuses concern on something that had not been adequately addressed before -the possibility of catastrophe" (Gibson, 1985a) . Another industry leader described the post-Bhopal environment as "chemophobia" (Gunningham, 1995: 72) .
Contemporaneous reports provide evidence that industry participants now had a greater sense of being part of a commons. Then chairman of Union Carbide, Warren Anderson, remarked, "This is not a Carbide issue. This is an industry issue" (Gibson, 1985a: 21) . Others noted that with such a close focus on the industry, further accidents at any chemical firm would have significant consequences for all chemical manufacturers. "Every chemical incident becomes a national story now. A minor spill becomes front page stuff, and that tends to exaggerate the event and reinforce the public's concern" (Gibson, 1985b: 90) .
Respondents also report that the crisis drove industry members to create a prominent selfregulatory institution: The American Chemistry Council 1 (ACC)'s Responsible Care program.
"More than anything else," recalls [then] Union Carbide CEO Robert Kennedy, "it was Bhopal that finally put us on the path that would lead to Responsible Care." "Bhopal was the wake-up call," says [then] Dow Chemical vice president Dave Buzelli. "It brought home to everybody that we could have the best performance in the world but if another company had an accident, all of us would be hurt, so we started to work together" (Rees, 1997: 485) .
The first element of the program, Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER), appeared designed to reduce concern about accidents. Responsible Care encouraged
firms to "open the doors and let the fresh air flow through" (Coombes, 1991) so that a skeptical public would be convinced that the dangers that Bhopal had brought to light were being rigorously dealt with and that they were not in imminent danger. Responsible Care required extensive outreach efforts with local officials in communities where plants were located. As part of CAER, firms conducted thousands of plant tours. The ACC also spent millions on advertising campaigns to humanize the industry (Heller, 1991) .
The program did not include a mechanism for third party certification of compliance with the rules, and thus critics argued that it was unlikely to help stakeholders accurately determine those firms with higher performance (Ember, 1995) . Others argued, however, that close connections in the industry could allow members to police adherence to the rules (Rees, 1997) .
As discussed earlier, empirical studies suggested that firms did not reduce their pollution any faster than non-participants, but that the industry still benefited from the existence of the program (King & Lenox, 2000; Lenox, 2006) .
Sample
Our sample includes all firms in the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) database that reported any operations in the chemical industry (SIC 2800 to 2899) in the Compustat business segment database between 1980 and 2000 or reported to the Environmental Protection Agency that they operated a production facility in these sectors. We chose this time period to allow a nearly five-year pretest window before the Bhopal accident (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) , a
five-year interval between the accident and the creation of Responsible Care (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) , and an 11-year post-test window after the creation of Responsible Care (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . We chose the sample to include all firms with any chemical operations, rather than only those with a primary denomination in the chemical industry, so as to include diversified firms with significant though non-dominant chemical operations. Our final sample includes 735 unique firms.
Data Sources
We obtained data about our sample firms from the CRSP database, the Compustat business sector database, and the Environmental Protection Agency's Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). Reporting to the TRI began in 1987 and covers facilities with 10 or more employees that produce, store, release, or transfer more than a threshold amount of any of more than 600 listed chemicals. We obtained data about errors by performing key word searches of the major international and U.S. regional newspapers and wire databases within the Lexis-Nexis service.
In some cases, we supplemented information from news articles with information from Hoovers online database and Dialogweb.
Dependent Variable
We hypothesize that an "error" at one firm can "harm" other firms in this industry. To form our dependent variable we must operationalize both of these terms. Managers in the chemical industry consider industrial accidents to be serious errors (Greening & Johnson, 1997) .
Industry experts further claim that the Bhopal crisis changed the degree to which industrial accidents harmed the industry (Gibson, 1985b) . Thus, we use industrial accidents at chemical operations as our measure of "error."
To find industrial accidents, we performed keyword searches using terms such as fire, gas leak, explosion, chemical spill, chemical release, and chemical discharge. These are terms that top managers in the chemical industry associate with serious accidents (Greening & Johnson, 1997 ). Our search uncovered 359 possible accidents. As with any keyword search, however, we netted numerous inappropriate events such as chlorine burns in swimming pools or ammonia spills on restaurant floors. We also found numerous accidents related to transportation (e.g. a truck overturned and exploded at the corner of I-90 and Route 1) and accidents related to petroleum transport and refining. We included accidents at refining operations, a segment closely aligned with chemicals (Hoffman, 1997) , but we excluded leaks and spills from crude oil pumping or transport (e.g. the Exxon Valdez accident). Incomplete reporting about key aspects of accidents further narrowed the sample. In total, we were able to qualify and determine the date, magnitude, location, and responsible firm for 123 of the raw events.
Problems with the size of events or contemporaneous firm actions caused removal of an additional 40 accidents. Twenty-five accidents resulted in neither an injury nor death. Our preliminary analysis showed that such accidents were too minor to affect the stock price of even the firms directly responsible for them, and so we excluded these events from our study of the spillover effects. At the opposite end of the scale, we removed the Bhopal event due to its extreme nature. Finally, events should not be confounded with endogenous actions that might bias coefficient estimates (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) . We excluded fifteen events because other significant activities were mentioned in the newspaper accounts of the event (e.g. leadership changes). This left us with 83 accidents. 2
To measure the degree to which these accidents "harm" other firms in the industry, we evaluate the stock price movements of other firms with chemical operations following each accident. Market theory suggests that stock prices reflect the best assessment of future cash flows for firms. If investors think that stakeholder sanction might reduce demand or government regulation might increase a firm's costs, then the stock price should fall. The more a firm's stock price depends on that of another firm, the more they share a type of industry commons.
Appendix A describes how we capture the harm of each accident with our dependent variable, cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which is a measure of how much a stock's value deviated from its expected value over a particular period of time. To validate that our search uncovered a set of accidents that might influence stock value, we explored the effect of these accidents on CAR for the firms directly responsible for the events. As Appendix B shows, five days after these 83 events the stock price of the firm responsible for the accident fell an average of 1.2%.
Accidents where an employee was killed caused about a 2.7% further reduction in the firm's stock price. Thus, the accidents in our sample have a measurable effect on stock prices.
Independent Variables
We hypothesize that one firm's error can spill over to other firms within the same "industry." Scholars commonly use the standard industrial classification (SIC) code as the definition of an industry. As discussed above, since we are looking at accidents in the chemical industry, we limit our sample to firms that have at least some operations in the 2800 SIC range that encompasses chemicals. We also create a more refined measure of operations in the same industry by creating a binary variable (Same SIC) that captures whether a firm owns a facility that is in the same SIC code as the one that had an accident 3 .
Our second hypothesis predicts that a major crisis will increase this spillover effect. As previously discussed, industry insiders assert that Bhopal caused a major crisis that affected all firms with chemical operations. To capture the changes caused by Bhopal, we create a dummy variable (Pre Bhopal) that captures the time period from the beginning of our sample to December 3, 1984. It takes on a value of one during this time and a value of zero otherwise.
Our third hypothesis predicts that industry self-regulation decreases this spillover effect.
Aspects of the Responsible Care program began shortly after the Bhopal crisis, but no elements of the program were promulgated until late 1989. Thus, to capture the post Responsible Care period, we create a dummy variable, Post RC, which takes on a value of 1 after 1989; else zero.
Finally, in order to explore the mechanisms of industry self-regulation, we must distinguish Responsible Care participants from non-participants. To capture this effect, we measure membership in the parent association, the American Chemistry Council. This variable (ACC Member) takes on a value of one if the ACC listed the company as a member in a given
year, and has a value of zero otherwise. From 1990 onward, participation in Responsible Care was a condition of membership in ACC. We further separate out the unique attributes of the Responsible Care program by creating a dummy variable (RC Member) that indicates ACC membership during a year when the Responsible Care program was in existence. We also seek to understand whether Responsible Care may have had a different effect depending on the identity of the firm responsible for an accident. Thus, we create variables (Perp ACC and Perp RC) that capture whether or not the firm that had the accident is a member of the American Chemistry Council or Responsible Care.
Control Variables
Variation in the magnitude of an event should cause variation in the market's response, so we include two measures of each accident's severity. Emp Killed is a binary variable that takes a value of one if an employee was killed in the accident. Only about 25% of our accidents include a fatality, so the binary parameterization is appropriate and truncates little information.
In contrast, we measure the number of employees injured (Emp Injured) using a continuous measure (log(# injured +1)). We use the log parametric form to reduce the effect of outliers and to account for possible diminishing effects. Alternative parametric forms (binary and linear) reduce model fit but do not change the sign and significance of reported results.
The size of both the perpetrator and the recipient firm may influence the market response to accidents. Larger perpetrators often have better public relations and so may be able to diffuse public reaction and response. Assets of Perp measures the log of total assets for the firm where the accident occurred. It is likely that larger firms will be influenced less by accidents at other firms, either because they are better able to manage their public relations or because they tend to be more diversified. Moreover, the size of a firm influences the variability of its stock performance (Fama & French, 1992) . We measure size of the firm (Assets) as the log of total assets reported in Compustat for the year the accident occurred.
---INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE---
We use several approaches to reduce the potential for endogenous managerial choice to bias our coefficient estimates. We include fixed effects of different types to control for unobserved (but constant) differences in our sample (e.g., accident industry, spillover industry, and the year of the accident). To control for unobserved firm-level differences, in some models we include fixed effects for the firm itself. These fixed effects account for constant attributes of any firm that might influence spillover effects.
Endogenous choice processes might also bias our sample, particularly if they are based on changing firm characteristics not captured by our fixed effects. To help account for these, we also conduct a Heckman two-stage treatment model. The first stage consists of the model predicting participation in Responsible Care. We base the treatment selection function on a model of membership proposed by King and Lenox (2000) . They find that participation in Responsible Care was influenced by a firm's relative emissions, the relative emissions of the industries in which it operates, the degree to which it is focused in chemicals, its size, and its reputation. Following their study, we use TRI data to estimate the median emissions for each industry (4 digit SIC) and create a weighted measure of this value (based on percentages of sales in this SIC) for each firm 4 . The log of this value becomes our measure of the degree to which a firm operates in sectors with many toxic chemicals (Industry Emissions). We measure the degree to which a firm operates in chemicals (Chemical Focus) by calculating the percentage of sales from chemical sectors (as estimated from Compustat data). We already have a measure of the size of the firm (Assets). Due to the limitation of the TRI, we cannot estimate relative performance prior to 1987. We also cannot measure contemporaneous measures of a firm's reputation for all of the firms in our sample. Descriptive statistics for these variables can be found in Appendix C.
Analytical Methodology
Event study methodologies are commonly used to understand how stockholders interpret a single event (Brown & Warner, 1980 Blacconiere & Patten, 1994; Hamilton, 1995; Patten & Nance, 1998) . McWilliams and Siegel (1997) have criticized the use of this method when firms might be able to alter or time the focal event so that it occurs concurrent with some other announcement. Accidents, however, are by their very nature unplanned and not amenable to strategic timing. Thus, such manipulation is not a concern in this study.
Our event study analysis allows us to connect an accident with abnormal stock price movements. To understand the causes of variance within these movements, we use a linear regression:
where CAR ij is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i 5 days following event j and X ij is a vector of independent variables for firm i at the time of event j . Clearly we cannot measure every possible factor that might influence the effect of an accident or the spillover from that accident to other firms. We use a series of fixed effects to try to reduce potential problems from unobserved heterogeneity. First, we attempt to account for unobservables in the industries in which the accident occurred. We include a fixed effect ( p υ ) for all p industries in which we have more than a single accident (16 out of 22 industries). Second, we account for potential differences among industries that were affected by the accident (but not necessarily the one in which they occurred) by including fixed effects for every two-digit SIC code ( l u ). Alternatively, when we are considering issues of variable spillover among firms and are interested in the effect of variables that are not collinear with firm identity, we include both firm ( i ν ) and year ( t δ ) fixed effects.
Clearly, the decision to join the American Chemistry Council and participate in Responsible Care is endogenous to our analysis. That is, managers make decisions about participation conditional on the characteristics of their organization. To the extent that we capture the important firm characteristics through the inclusion of a direct measure or by the use of fixed effects, our coefficient estimate should be unbiased. These methods will fail, however, to capture the effect of endogenous choice based on changing and unmeasured factors. To account for such factors and test the robustness of our analysis, we perform a two-stage Heckman treatment model. This method uses a first stage model to estimate the potential effect of the unobserved choice process on residuals, and then a second stage regression that includes a correction for the estimated distortions of the error terms cause by the endogenous choice process 5 . INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE- --5 Often, treatment models in panels cannot be specified because unobserved determinants of the "stickiness" of choice processes cannot be identified. In our case, we are conducting robustness analysis and thus are willing to specify a model that provides the strongest robustness test. As a result, we first specify a model that assumes firms have great flexibility about participation. That is, we assume that the choice of participation in any year is independent from previous years. To ensure the robustness of our findings to the opposite extreme assumption, we then estimated a model that assumes that the choice to participate is made only once based on average firm characteristics over the panel. Both results were consistent (in sign and significance) with those presented.
RESULTS
---
To explore the effect of spillovers from accidents, we evaluate the abnormal stock market movements of members of the industry (not including the perpetrator) after an accident. To get a sense of the average scale of such spillovers, in Table 2 we first specify a simple model without fixed effects or interaction terms. In support of Hypothesis 1, Model 1 shows that firms that operated a facility in the same industry in which the accident occurred indeed experienced a negative spillover. We also find that accidents in which a person was killed or many were injured had a greater spillover. Note that the effects are smaller than those to the focal firm (see Appendix B) but are still significant. Following an accident that injured an average number of employees (~ 5), a chemical firm with operations in the same industry as that of the accident could expect to lose 0.2% of its stock price. After an accident that caused the death of an employee, the firm could expect to lose an additional 0.8%.
To explore whether the accident at Bhopal or the formation of Responsible Care influenced spillovers from accidents, we specify a new model (Model 2) with two dummy variables that capture the time period before the Bhopal accident and after the formation of Responsible Care (Pre Bhopal and Post RC). Our results suggest that spillovers from accidents indeed increased after Bhopal and diminished after the formation of Responsible Care. In the intervening time period, an average accident could be expected to reduce the stock price of other firms with operations in that industry by about 1.1%. We find that before Bhopal, this loss was only about 0.4% and after the creation of Responsible Care it was negligible.
The increased spillovers after the Bhopal accident provide corroborating evidence for the observations of industry members. Speaking after the Bhopal accident Dan Bishop, then
Monsanto's director for environmental communication remarked, "Every chemical incident becomes a national story now. A minor spill becomes front page stuff, and that tends to exaggerate the event and reinforce the public's concern" (Gibson, 1985b: 90) . Industry members also recognized that further accidents created greater spillover harm: "[T]he damage to Union Carbide's credibility has had a spillover effect for the rest of the industry" (Gibson, 1985b: 90) .
Industry managers also noted that one stakeholder in particular -insurance companies -formally implemented this increased perception of risk in a way that affected all firms in the industry, regardless of their individual characteristics: "Now the Bhopal tragedy has reinforced the new conservatism of insurance underwriters and, as one broker puts it, given them 'an excuse to say no.'…when they see any operations associated with chemicals -even chemical operations posing no hazard to the public -[underwriters] are ready to paint them with the same brush as Bhopal's" (Katzenberg, 1985: 30) .
The fact that Models 1 and 2 corroborate perceptions in the industry helps demonstrate the validity of the findings. Nevertheless, we subjected our analysis to extensive robustness testing. Neither model includes controls for unobserved industry differences for the industry of the accident or the main industry of the firms, nor do they account for differences in the characteristics of the perpetrator or the subject firm. In Model 3, we include additional variables and fixed effects to account for such differences. We again find consistent results. We also find that accidents from larger firms have a reduced spillover effect.
Models 1 to 3, in combination with the corroboration of industry insider reports, provide strong support for Hypotheses 1 to 3. Accidents do cause spillover harm, and consistent with the logic behind Hypothesis 1, this harm is greater for larger accidents and for firms that were more similar to the one where the accident occurred. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, this harm appears to have increased following a crisis in the industry. In support of Hypothesis 3, this spillover harm decreased after the formation of a self-regulatory institution.
In Model 4, we begin our exploration of the mechanism of Responsible Care. To explore whether Responsible Care provided a general benefit to the industry (Hypothesis 4a) or only acted when one of its member firms was responsible for an accident (Hypothesis 4b), we include additional interaction terms to capture spillovers from an ACC member in both time periods. In support of Hypothesis 4b, we find a positive and significant coefficient for the variable Perp RC,
indicating reduced harm to firms in our sample when an accident occurred at an ACC firm after the creation of the Responsible Care program. The inclusion of this variable also reduces the significance of the coefficient for our variable denoting the Responsible Care time period. Thus, we do not find evidence in support of Hypothesis 4a that spillover harms were reduced for accidents at any firm, regardless of its membership in Responsible Care.
Our findings that Responsible Care functioned to reduce spillover harm when one of its members experienced an accident is corroborated by the contemporaneous reports of industry experts. After touring the site of an Exxon Chemical plant in his city, one city manager noted:
I don't harbor the fears that I had. I have learned about what they do. I hadn't realized the safety precautions, the amount of testing of final products, the monitoring of air and water that goes on. But I don't think this will eliminate all skepticism. It's ludicrous to think that industry is going to be safe all the time. But the fact that they have been open and honest is extremely important to me as city manager (Heller, 1991) .
Others reported that when accidents inevitably did occur, Responsible Care coordinated a quick response. "'Mutual assistance' is on all Responsible Care practitioners' lips, with large firms helping out small firms an important dynamic" (Heller & Hunter, 1994) . Richard Doyle, vice president of Responsible Care, described such efforts as operating out of a "war room."
The emergency response effort in the war room also led to an upgrade in Chemtrec, recognized as the chemical emergency response center in the U.S. It was established in 1972 to provide timely information and connect emergency responders with industry experts on the chemicals they were dealing with. After
Bhopal, CMA set about upgrading Chemtrec's operations and improving its mutual assistance activities (Begley, 1994) .
Robustness Testing
To ensure the robustness of our analysis, we specified several alternative models. First, we used two methods to account for endogenous choice processes based on unobserved fixed firm differences. As shown in Model 5, a model with firm fixed effects further confirms our previous findings. We again find that spillover harm increased following Bhopal and that
Responsible Care reduced this harm by reducing the spillover from participating firms. Since fixed effect (FE) analysis represents a more stringent test, Model 5 provides strong confirmation of our results.
In Model 6, we perform further robustness testing by correcting for the influence of endogenous managerial choices. We report the second stage of a Heckman treatment estimation.
As discussed earlier, this model is specified to be sensitive to any changing firm attributes that might explain membership in the ACC and Responsible Care. The probit for the first stage of the 1990 analysis is shown in Appendix C. It is consistent with King and Lenox (2000) and
suggests that ACC members tend to be in sectors with more toxic emissions, more focused in chemicals, and have more assets. We control for the effect of this endogenous choice by including the Mills Ratio estimated by the probit model for each year as a variable in the second stage regression. This model provides confirmatory evidence of the robustness of our findings.
In Model 7, we cease our analysis of the effect of time periods so as to allow the use of year fixed effects to account for any underlying macroeconomic changes that might effect our results. Once we include these year effects, we must remove the time period dummy variables.
As shown, an analysis with year fixed effects again suggests that Responsible Care provided a benefit to the industry by reducing the spillover effect of an accident at a RC firm. Thus, we again confirm our support for Hypothesis 4b.
We also conducted additional robustness testing to determine if our time period dummy variables (Pre Bhopal and Post RC) might be capturing some other temporal effect. First, we tested whether differences in the frequency of reporting might influence responses to accidents.
To rule out this possibility, we specified models that included measures of the accident previous to the one under consideration. We included the days since this accident, whether an employee was killed, and whether an employee was injured. Models with additional variables confirm the sign and significance of the reported results. We also explored whether our measure Post Bhopal might simply be capturing a wearing off of stakeholder concern as the accident became a more distant memory. We tested alternative models with linear and log time since Bhopal (in days).
Coefficient estimates on both variables were not statistically significant. The log form of the time estimate is highly correlated with the Pre Bhopal variable (ρ = -0.81) and thus it reduces the significance of this measure in some models. Neither variable provided significant additional explanatory power.
Throughout our analysis, we explain little of the observed variance in stock pricesbetween 1 and 3%. This is not at all surprising. Our method essentially removes fixed differences in stock prices, leaving only noise and the effect of new information about a firm.
We evaluate the effect of only one type of news, and clearly additional numerous other factors play an important role in determining stock prices. However, so long as this other news is not correlated with our events and uncaptured by our variables, our estimates should be unbiased.
As discussed earlier, we carefully screened out events that were contemporaneous with other corporate news. Moreover, the robustness of our analysis to multiple specifications and controls suggests that we have significant and stable estimates.
In summary, our analysis suggests that Bhopal indeed increased the interdependence of firms with chemical operations such that an accident at one would have a negative effect on another. Our analysis also suggests that Responsible Care reduced this spillover effect, but it did so not by insulating its members from the consequences of accidents at other facilities, but by reducing the consequences of accidents at Responsible Care facilities.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we explain industry self-regulation where physical commons are absent.
We posit that firms in modern industries share in a non-physical type of commons -what some have termed a "reputation commons" (King et al., 2002) -that stems from the difficulty that stakeholders face in distinguishing the relative performance of individual firms and from the blunt application of arbitrary or industry-wide sanctions. We hypothesize that the risks associated with this commons can become particularly acute following a major industry crisis.
We further hypothesize that industries create self-regulatory institutions as a means of ameliorating this heightened threat of shared sanctions.
Employing a longitudinal analysis of our hypothesis, we find that firms in the US chemical industry did face such an industry commons and that the shared sanctions stemming from this commons became more severe after the industry suffered a major crisis caused by an accident in Bhopal, India. Furthermore, we find that this increased risk of shared sanctions preceded the creation of the industry's self-regulatory program, Responsible Care, and that
Responsible Care was able to ameliorate industry-wide harm from the errors of individual chemical firms. Thus, in finding that an aggravated commons problem led to the formation of a governing institution and that it operated to reduce this problem, our study supports the extension of Ostrom's (1990) perspective on community self-regulation of common pool resources into modern industry as a way of explaining industry self-regulation.
We also explore the mechanism through which Responsible Care functioned. We find that it reduced the industry wide harm from the errors of Responsible Care participants, but we find no evidence that it buffered Responsible Care participants from the acts of others.
Responsible Care did not solve the industry commons problem for member firms by fencing off participants from the acts of outsiders. Rather, it fenced off everyone from the actions of participating firms. Thus, by joining, each firm provided a public benefit to the industry, and the need to coordinate this benefit may have provided a key motivation for the institution.
In Mending Wall, poet Robert Frost wrote of a type of self-regulation that functions much like the one we identify. Each winter, storms and hunters knocked down the stone wall that ran around his property, and every spring Frost would "let [his] neighbor know beyond the hill" that they need to "meet to walk the line, and set the wall between us once again." But, as he worked on the wall one year, he wondered why they were remaking it and asked his neighbor: share in the construction of a wall between them. We show that they need the wall because each can indeed harm the other. They need to meet, we find, to "wall in" the effects of inevitable accidents, keeping each more isolated, and so all more protected. Responsible Care is a means of ensuring that each firm maintains its walls and so protects its neighbors.
As evidenced by Frost's poem, traditions of mending fences to prevent spillover harm have an ancient history. Societies all over the world have developed norms to ensure that each member acts to protect his neighbor. Indeed, the very normalcy of such traditions represents the culmination of Frost's poem. Speaking of his neighbor, Frost notes, "He will not go behind his father's saying, and he likes having thought of it so well, he says again, 'Good fences make good neighbors.'" Our analysis suggests that analogs to such traditional responses can be found in modern industries. Firms unite with rivals to ensure that each buffers the other from a future problem. Because they are "walling in" their own effect on their neighbors, individual firms cannot achieve such results independently. Rather, at-risk firms must come together to create an institution that helps ensure that each protects his neighbor.
Theoretical Implications
Beyond its implications for extending Ostrom's (1990) community self-regulation perspective on common pool resources into the literature on industry self-regulation, our study suggests that management scholars should "endogenize" factors that have been presumed exogenous to management analysis. Traditionally, firms and their governing institutions have been viewed as distinct entities, with institutions establishing the "rules of the game" (North, 1990 ) and firms strategically playing by those rules. Industry self-regulation entails firms creating an institution that sets and enforces rules governing how member firms are expected to behave, and so it muddles the divide between those who make the rules and those who play the game. By demonstrating that firms can come together to create an institution to govern their own behavior when faced with a common problem, we thus respond to the many recent calls for increased focus on agency in institutional theory (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Dacin, Goodstein & Scott, 2002; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997) .
The relative inattention to agency in institutional theory may be attributable, in part, to measurement difficulties. Prior studies have relied on a variety of indirect proxies to assess institutional conditions over time, such as counts of press articles, lawsuits, regulatory actions, and shareholder proxy contests (e.g., Davis & Thompson, 1994; Hoffman, 1997; Miles, 1982) .
However, as argued above, in some situations, changing institutional conditions can best be measured by analysis of variations in stock market values. Such values represent the mean expectations of investors and so provide a good indicator of how perceptions of a given firm fluctuate over time. This study, by drawing attention to such a readily available and consistent longitudinal measure, may facilitate "good functionalism" studies that compare conditions both before and after a new institution is created. Lack of such studies is "one of the biggest barriers to creating a richer theory" (Ingram & Clay, 2000: 539) of institutions and so more such studies are "badly needed" (Ingram & Clay, 2000: 540) to advance institutional theory.
Managerial Implications
Our research suggests that prior skepticism about the viability of industry self-regulation may be based on an incorrect assumption about the institution's function, and so previous empirical studies may have measured the wrong attributes. Our study suggests that the institution does not function as a signal to observers that member firms are only those with superior or improving performance. Instead, it serves as a pact to reduce stakeholder concern through greater outreach and communication, as we show happened in the chemical industry through its CAER program. Such outreach and communication can have a positive effect on stakeholder relations regardless of the performance of the member firms, and it provides a basis for distinguishing one firm's acts from others and so aids in walling in potential spillover effects.
Our research also suggests that managers in an industry can maintain a self-regulatory institution, even when it provides spillover benefit to non-members. Our findings suggest that the institution protected all firms from the errors of its members. Thus, participants in the program provide a public good to the industry. Despite the incentive to free ride, however, firms agree to participate and (over the years of our analysis at least) the program provides a benefit to the industry.
For policy makers, our research reveals that private institutions may substitute in part for public regulation on information disclosure. The need to prevent spillover harm can help drive the creation of institutions that require the disclosure of information to stakeholders. Thus, government programs on information disclosure should be analyzed by considering both their direct effect on firm behavior and their indirect effect on the formation and function of selfregulatory institutions.
Limitations and Future Research
While our study addresses several long-standing issues, it also raises several new ones.
We use stock price movements to measure changes in stakeholder expectations about firms over time following specific industry events. This methodology does not allow us to observe the mechanisms that created changes in stakeholders' expectations of a firm's future performance.
We do not directly observe, for example, the provision of information from the firm to these stakeholders. In our particular empirical setting, we note that the CAER program, which is at the core of Responsible Care, requires members to engage in significant communication with stakeholders, but we do not actually measure the degree to which members abided by these requirements. In future research, we hope to directly evaluate differences in communication rates and styles among participants and non-participants.
In our study, we described industry self-regulation as a private decentralized institution, but it typically involves a central authority. In examples such as that of Responsible Care, there exists a governing body that oversees compliance with the program's codes. However, compliance is often gauged through self-reporting and punishment tends to be limited or nonexistent, given antitrust concerns as well as the institution's desire to retain as many members as possible. Thus, even in exemplary and robust instances such as Responsible Care, industry selfregulation tends toward a decentralized model, relying on peer pressure for compliance.
Nonetheless, it would be more accurate to recast industry self-regulation as a hybrid form of private institution since it contains both centralized and decentralized aspects.
This suggests that Ingram and Clay's (2000) centralized-decentralized dichotomy for institutions might better be treated as a continuum, and it raises the question of how institutions choose to position themselves along this continuum, both initially and over time. Our study addresses temporal changes, but it does not address changes within the program itself.
Responsible Care started as a primarily decentralized institution but over time has shifted toward more centralized authority. The program evolved over the 1990s as new codes were hammered out and promulgated to members. After our study timeframe ended, Responsible Care's leadership changed -in part because of several articles which suggested that the program had not reduced the pollution generated by its members -and reportedly with the new leadership, the "velvet glove came off" and some members were disciplined for their lax behavior (Reisch, 1998 members, yet the appearance that standards are enforced may be essential to maintaining the legitimacy of the program in the eyes of observers. In future research, we hope to explore the drivers and mechanisms of these changes.
Finally, our study does not resolve the issue of why firms choose to participate in selfregulatory programs. If participating firms essentially "wall in" their spillovers, safeguarding the rest of the industry, then the institution provides a pure public good. Given the dominating incentive to free ride on pure public goods (Olson, 1965) , how then does the institution hold together? Scholars have suggested that the incestuous nature of the chemical industry allows bilateral sanctions that enforce participation. According to Rees (1997: 489) , "the chemical industry is its own best customer," and large firms use their power over subordinate suppliers as "leverage" (Gunningham, 1995: 85) to obtain their compliance. Yet aside from a few anecdotes, such sanctions remain unobserved. In future research, we hope to further explore the centripetal forces that hold this and similar institutions together.
Despite these limitations our research makes a significant contribution to emerging scholarship on self-regulatory institutions and ongoing scholarship on agency in institutional theory. It shows that exchange problems caused by shared reputation and risk of sanction exist in modern industries. It shows that a major crisis can intensify problems associated with this industry commons. Finally, it shows that when faced with exchange problems caused by these commons, the choice is not between Leviathan or Oblivion (Ophuls, 1973) . Industry members can take matters into their own hands and repair shared problems by forging a new institution. 
APPENDIX A Calculation of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)
To calculate CAR, we first calculated the relationship between the value of each company's stock and the market as a whole (measured by the CRSP value-weighted index with dividends for the entire market) R it = a i + B i R mt + e it ;
where R it represents the value of the security i on day t, a i is a constant, R mt represents the value of the market portfolio for day t, B i represents the Beta of security i, and e it represents the error term. Beta is computed over the period t = -254 to t = -1, where t = 0 is the day of the event.
The abnormal return of a stock is the difference between the actual return of that stock and its expected return. The abnormal return of security i at time t, AR it , is:
The cumulative abnormal return for a firm, CAR i , is the sum of abnormal returns over the event window:
To allow for continuous compounding when aggregating the abnormal returns, ln(1+R) is used in place of R. Thus, CAR i = ∑ [ln(1+R it) -(a + B im ln(1+R mt) ))] Key to computation of CAR is determination of the event window, the period of time over which to cumulate abnormal returns. Event studies commonly begin the event window prior to the actual event announcement in order to account for information leakage, but dangerous accidents are, by nature, unanticipated events. Therefore, in this study, if the event occurred during trading hours on a trading day, the window begins that day; if not, the window begins with the next trading day.
While it is straightforward to choose the beginning of the event window for this study, it is less clear when to close the window. The occurrence and magnitude of events sometimes take several days to become apparent to the market. While news travels fast and markets update their values nearly instantaneously, many characteristics of major accidents take time to establish. For example, the enormous toll of Bhopal took many days to unfold, and the magnitude of the Exxon Valdez oil spill was not immediately evident. Whereas a long event window increases the likelihood of capturing the full impact of unfolding events, a long event window also increases the opportunity for intervening events to confound results (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) . Therefore, researchers should use the shortest possible window that captures the fullest extent of the event. The bulk of the effects tended to occur within five days after the event. Thus, our dependent variable in this study is the cumulative abnormal return on the 5 th day after an event. 
APPENDIX B The Effect of Accidents on Return of At-Fault Firms
